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Case Western Reserve University

'BRAR'l
Confessions pl~~'#rlH~~t role in criminal prosecutions. Despite landmark decisions such as Miranda v.
Arizona, criminal defendants continue to make incriminatory statements. In addition, the initial controversy that
greeted Miranda and other confession cases has not
abated. Recently, Attorney General Meese commented:
The Miranda decision was wrong. We managed very well in
this country for 175 years without it. Its practical effect is to
prevent the police from talking to the person who knows the
most about the crime- namely, the perpetrator. As it now
stands under Miranda, if the police obtain a statement from
that person in the course of the initial interrogation, the
statement may be thrown out at the trial. Therefore, Miranda
only helps guilty defendants. Most innocent people are glad
to talk to the police. They want to establish their innocence
so that they're no longer a suspect. U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 14, 1985, at 67.

For recent articles on Miranda, see Caplan, Questioning
Miranda, 38 Vand. L. Rev.- (1985); White, Defending
Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 38 Variq. L. Rev.
- 1986); Frey, Modern Police Interrogation Law: The
Wrong Road Taken, 42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 731 (1981); lnbau,
Over-Reaction - The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73
J. Grim. L. & Criminology 797 (1982).
This article surveys the law of confessions. The admissibility of confessions raises numerous issues. Although
most of these issues are constitutional, several important
evidentiary issues are also involved. Moreover, several
different constitutional challenges are possible. Miranda
is based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Prior to that decision, however,
confessions were analyzed under the due process voluntariness test. That test remains intact and offers an independent constitutional basis for the suppression of
confessions. In addition, right to counsel issues have become increasingly important since the Supreme Court's
1977 decision in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Finally, confessions may be excluded on a derivative evidence or "fruit of the poisonous tree" theory. For example, a confession derived from an illegal arrest may be
suppressed due to an initial Fourth Amendment violation.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Admissions of a Party-Opponent
A defendant's out-of-court statements are, of course,
hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the assertions contained in the statement. Nevertheless, such statements
by an accused are admissions of a party-opponent and
are thus exempt from the hearsay rule when offered by
the prosecution. See Ohio Evid. R. 801 (D) (2) (a); United
States v. Garmany, 762 F.2d 929, 938 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956, 963 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 856 (1982); United States v. Hewitt, 663
F.2d 1381, 1388 (11th Cir. 1981). Admissions are not limited to statements made to the police. Any statement made
by the defendant to any person and at any time may be
an admission. This would include statements made prior
to arrest or, for that matter, prior to the crime. Futhermore,
an admission need not be incriminating; it need only relate to the offense. See Territory of Guam v. Ojeda, 758
F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1985).
One type of admission- an adoptive admissionpresents special problems. Adoptive admissions are also
exempt from the hearsay rule. Ohio A. Evid. 801 (D) (2)
(b). A statement made in the defendant's presence, that
he understood, and with which he agrees is admissible
as an adoptive admission. United States v. Farid, 733
F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), is illustrative. In that case
an accomplice made statements about a drug sale to
undercover officers. The statements were admitted
against the defendant as adoptive admissions because
he was present at the time and agreed with the accomplice's remarks.
The circumstances under which the statement was
made, however, must indicate an adoption or approval.
"The mere fact that the party declares that he has heard
that another person has made a given statement is not
standing alone sufficient to justify a finding that the party
has adopted the third person's statement." C. McCormick, Evidence 797 (3d ed. 1984). For example, in Fuson
v. Jago, 773 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1985), the defendant and an
accomplice were arrested for aggravated burglary. After
being advised of their rights, the accomplice made an
incriminating statement, at which point the arresting offi-
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cen!sked~!Jthen you bothwerebreaking in." The accomplice said'"yes." The defendant shrugged his shoulders.
On habeas review, the Sixth Circuit declined to find that
the defendant's "non-commital shrug constituted an adoption of [the accomplice's] statements .... [He] did not
verbally assent to [the]statements .... Nor would the petitioner be ~xpected to refute [the] statements after twice
being advised his right to remain silent." /d. at 61.

624 P.2d 440, 444 (1981). If the record does not qualify
under this hearsay exception, if could still be used to refresh the officer's recollection. See Ohio R. Evid. 613.
Plea Negotiations
Although confessions are admissible as party admissions, there is one other evidentiary rule that may preclude admissibility. Ohio Evidence Rule 410 provides:
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Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of a plea
of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of no contest, or the
equivalent plea from another jurisdiction, or a plea of guilty
in a violation bureau, or of an offer to plead guilty or no contest to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements
made in connection with and relevant to, any of the foregoing
pleas or offers, is not ad~issible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. ...
(emphasis added).

The adoptive admission rule also applies to documents, although the courts are divided on the scope of
the rule in this context. Compare United States v. Marino,
658 F.2d 1120, 1125 (6th Cir. 1981) (possession of a document with written statements is an adoption of its contents), with United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793,
800~01 (9th Cir. 1984) (possession of a document standing alone is not an adoptive admission).

Federal Rule 410 differs from its Ohio counterpart. It
provides for exclusion only if the statement is "made in
the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the
prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of
guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdraw."
(emphasis added). The difference between the Ohio and
federal rules is critical. The prior Federal Rule 410, which
is similar to the present Ohio rule, had been applied to
statements made by an accused to law enforcement
officers. See United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791,
795-99 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Brooks, 536 F.2d
1137, 1138-39 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 525
F.2d 1017, 1020-22 (10th Cir. 1975). Thus, Ohio Rule 410
provides a nonconstitutional basis for excluding statements made to the police during plea bargaining.
The test for determining whether a statement is excludable under Rule 410 was set forth in United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1978): "The trial court
must apply a two-tiered analysisand determine, first,
whether the accused exhibited an actuaJ subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation
was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances." /d. at 1366. Moreover, the legislative history indicates that Rule 410 also precludes the impeachment
use of the statement. See United States v. Lawson, 683
F.2d 688, 690-93 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Martinez,
536 F.2d 1107, 1108-09 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
985 (1976).

Confessions

Oral confessions
As noted above, confessions are admissible as party
admissions; Although some suspects do not realize it,
oral as well as written statements are admissible. As one
court has noted, "there can be no doubt that testimonial
evidence of an oral confession is legally admissible."
United States v. Dodier, 630 F.2d232, 236 (4th Cir. 1980).
See also United States v. Morris, 491 F. Supp. 226, 230
(S.D. Ga. 1980); Hayes v. State, 152 Ga. App. 858, 859,
264 S.E.2d 307,309 (1980).,
Even if an oral confession is recorded or transcribed,
there is no legal rule that requires the recorded or written
statemeht to be introduced by the prosecution. The original wri.ting ("Best Evidence") rule does not apply to oral
coiJfj:~_S_SiPB_S, even if lttey are recorded. Ohio R. Evid.
1002 provides: "To prove the content of a writing, recordi_ng,_()r ph()!Ograph the original writing, the recording, ~r
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided 1n
these rules or by statute enacted by the General Assembly not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme Court of
Ohio." In this situation, the prosecution is not proving the
content of a writing but rather an independent verbal
statement that happened to be recorded.
Written confessions
For tactical reasons, the prosecution generally prefers
to introduce a written confession in evidence if one is available. Typically, a defendant does not write out a confession. Instead, the police prepare the statement and
the g~femdant signs it. Such statements are adoptive
admissions. Even if the defendant does not sign the
statement, it may still be admitted as an adoptive admission if the prosecution can establish that he read it or otherwise adopted it. See Commonwealth v. Harper, 485 Pa.
572, 585 n.15, 403 A.2d 536, 543 n.15 (1979).

Impeachment
One other rule of evidence deserves attention. Admissions must be offered by the opposing party, i.e. the prosecution. Ohio Evidence Rule 801(D)(2) applies only when
the statement is "offered against a party" who made it.
Therefore, the rule does not permit the introduction of the
defendant's pretrial statements when offered by the defense unless those statements fall within some other exception to the hearsay rule.
If an accused's hearsay statements are admitted at
trial, either because they come within a hearsay exception or because the prosecution fails to object to their introduction, Rule 806 may apply. Rule 806 provides:

If the defendant does not adopt the written statement,
the statement may still be admissible as recorded recollection. See Ohio R. Evid. 803(5). This situation presents
a double hearsay problem. The defendant's oral statements are party admissions and the police's transcription
of these statements qualifies as recorded recollection
provided (1) the officer made the record when the matter
was fresh in his memory, (2) the record reflects the officer's knowledge correctly, and (3) the officer lacks sufficient recollection to testify fully and accurately about the
matter recorded. Ct. State v. Shaffer, 229 Kan. 310, 314,

When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule
801(0)(2), (c), (d), or (e), has been admitted in evidence, the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked
may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a wit-
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ness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at
any time, inconsistent with his hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that he may have been afforded an
opportunity to deny or explain. . . .
·

This rule applies to hearsay statements made by the accused and permits the prosecution to impeach the defendant, even thought the defendant has not testified. One
method of impeachment would be the introduction of evidence of the defendant's prior convictions. See United
States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (7th Cir.) (When a
defense counsel introduces a defendant's exculpatory
hearsay statements in evidence, the defendant's credibility becomes an issue and he may be impeached with a
prior conviction.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 63 (1985); United States v. Bovian, 708 F.2d 606, 613 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 898 (1983); United States v. Lawson, 608
F.2d 1129, 1130 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1091
(1980). Another method of impeachment would be the introduction of evidence of an inconsistent statement. See
United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1357-58 (11th
Cir. 1982) (prior inconsistent statement admitted to impeach declarant's hearsay statements), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 814 (1983).

found in a remote location. According to the court, the
prosecution failed to establish that the death was homicidal
by means of independent evidence.
There was no evidence, circumstantial or direct, of the
cause of death, or of any injury to the body or of any attempt
at concealment of the body. In sum, there is nothing in the
record on which to base even a suspicion of a homicide,
other than the fact that the victim was not known to be suffering from disease and was found in a lonely place. /d. at
84,425 N.E.2d at 918.

For other cases on the corpus delicti rule, see State v.
Black, 54 Ohio St.2d 304, 307-08, 376 N.E.2d 948, 951
(1978); State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038
(1916); State v. Duerr, 8 Ohio App.3d 396, 398-99, 457
N.E.2d 834, 838-39 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983). See generally C. McCormick, Evidence § 145 (3d
ed. 1984); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2070-74 (Chadbourn
rev. 1978); Comment, Corroborating Confessions: An
Empirical Analysis of Legal Safeguards Against False
Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 1121; Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d
1316 (1956).
DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court's initial confession cases were
based on the due process clause. In deciding these
cases, the Court employed a "voluntariness" test. From
the time it decided the first state confession case, Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), until it decided Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court applied the
voluntariness test in over thirty cases. The test was summarized by Justice Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961):

Corpus Delicti Rule
Virtually every jurisdiction has recognized some type
of corroboration rule for confessions. The rule is designed to "preclude[] the possibility of conviction of
crime based solely on statements made by a person suffering a mental or emotional disturbance or some other
aberration." Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453,
457, 466 N .E.2d 510, 513 (1984). As McCormick points
out, however, the formulation of this corroboration requirement may differ in the various jurisdictions.

The ultimate test ... [is] voluntariness. Is the confession the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by
its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of
his confession offends due process .... The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or
helps to propel the confession. /d. at 602.

Much confusion has been caused by failure to distinguish
between two different formulations of the requirement. One
requires only that in addition to the confession the record
contain evidence tending to establish the reliability of the
confession. The other- a requirement of independent
proof of the corpus delicti- requires that the corroborating
evidence tend to prove the commission of the crime at issue.
C. McCormick, Evidence 366 (3d ed. 1984).

See also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,
225-26 (1973) ..

In Ohio a confession is inadmissible if the corpus delicti has not been established by some evidence tending to
show two elements of the substance of the crime: (1) the
act, and (2) the criminal agency of the act. Neither a
prima facie case nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
required. State v. King, 10 Ohio App.3d 161, 166,460
N.E.2d 1383, 1389 (1983). Moreover, the Ohio Supreme
Court has written:

Purpose of the Voluntariness Test
Several distinct interests are protected by the voluntariness test. In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960),
the Supreme Court stated that "a complex of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court
terms involuntary." /d. at 207. In some cases, the Court
has focused on the unreliability of involuntary statements. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(confession obtained by beatings). In other cases, the
Court has focused on deterring offensive police conduct.
E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (confession obtained after police threatened to take defendant's
ailing wife into custody). In still other cases, the Court
has emphasized the defendant's lack of free will. E.g.,
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (confession obtained from defendant while under the influence of drugs
even though police were unaware of drug's effect).

Considering the revolution in criminal law of the 1960's and
the vast number of procedural safeguards protecting the
due-process rights of criminal defendants, the corpus delicti
rule is supported by few practical or social-policy considerations. This court sees little reason to apply the rule with a
dogmatic vengeance. State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31,
35-36, 358 N.E.2d 1051, 1056 (1976), vacated on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 911 (1978).

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the corpus delicti rule has been watered down to the point
where it no longer has much effect. In State v. Ralston, 67
Ohio App.2d 81, 425 N.E.2d 916 (1979), the defendant's
murder conviction was reversed because the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti. In that case the
defendant confessed to murder after a skeleton was

Relevant Factors
In applying the voluntariness test, courts have looked
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to .ttl!'! tot.ality_ ofci rcum~~~r:JG~l:iJ?JJirQ_l.JJJ~:Ung th(3. G91lf§$sion, including the characteristics· of the accused and the
police conduct, to determine their psychological impact
on the accused's a!Ji!ity to resist pressures to confess.
Wigmore lists the following factors as relevant to determining the voluntariness of a confession:

Q(3v,elopments in the Law-Confessions, 79
Harv. L. Rev. 935 (1966).

Contrast with Miranda
Although the Miranda decision overshadowed the importance of the voluntariness doctrine, the doctrine is still
important. C. McCormick, Evidence 376 (3d ed. 1984)
(voluntarin(3sl) c:l_Q(;1rine "continues to have substantial
current vitality."). The due process voluntariness test and
the Miranda rules differ significantly. "The tWo issues the voluntariness of a confession and compliance with
Miranda's strictures - are analytically separate inquires."State v. Arrington, 14 Ohio App.3d 111, 112 n.1,
470-N:I:::2cF2lt:~213"n.1 (1984). See also State v. Chase,
55 Ohio St.2d 237, 246-47, 378 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (1978);
Statev. Kassow, 280hio St.2d 141, 143-45,277 N.E.2d
435,439 (1971).
A due process challenge may be viable in a situation
where Miranda would not be applicable- for example,
prior to custodial interrogation. United States v. Murphy,
763 F.2d 202 (6thCir, 1985), is an illustrative case. In that
case a robbery suspect was tracked by a 88-pound German shepherd police dog. The dog dragged the defendant from trees in which he had been hiding. As a consequence, the defendant screamed: "You caught us. You
caught us. Getthis fucking dog off me. We shouldn't
have robbed the bank." The court held the statement involuntary. Moreover, even if the police comply with Miranda, a statement still may be ina(jmissible under a due
process analysis. For example, in United States v. Brown,
557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977), the defendant was read the
Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, the court suppressed
his statement on due process grounds because it was
obtained after a violent arrest and after the defendant
had been struck by the police. See also State v. Arrington, 14 Ohio App.3d 111,470 N.E.2d 211 (1984) (improper
inducemerlts ancrmisstaten1ents6f la.w·rendered statement involuntary even though Miranda warnings given).
Several other differences between Miranda and the
voluntariness test are noteworthy. As will be discussed
later, the Supreme Court has recognized an impeachment exception to Miranda. The Court, however, has declined to recognize a comparable exception for involuntary statements. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978), the Court wrote: "Statements made by a defendantin circumstances violating thestrictures of Miranda . .. are admissible for impeachment if their 'trustworthiness ... satisfies legal standards.'... But any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law ... ."/d. at 397-98.
Addressing the facts in the record, the Court held:
"Mincey was weakened by pain and shock, isolated from
family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely conscious,
and his will was simply overborne. Due process of law requires that statements obtained as these were cannot be
used in any way against a defendant at his trial." /d. at
401-02 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court in New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), recognized a public
safety exception to Miranda. In a footnote, however, the
Court noted that this exception would not apply to involuntary statements: "[The] respondent is certainly free on
remand to argue that his statement was coerced under
traditional due process standards." /d.- n.5.
Another difference is that Miranda does not apply to

1. Character of Accused
Health. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
Age. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
Education. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
Subnormal intelligence. Fikes v. Alabama, 352,
u.s. 191 (1957).
Mental condition. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
u.s. 199 (1960).
Prior criminal experience. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).

2. Character of Detention
Delay in arraignment. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342

u.s. 55 (1951).
Failure to warn of rights. Haynes v. Washington,
373 u.s. 503 (1963).
Length of incommunicado detention. Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
Living conditions. Davis v. North Carolina, 384
u.s. 737 (1966).
Access to lawyer, friends or others. Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).

3. Manner of Interrogation
Lengthy periods of questioning. Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
Use of relays. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949).
Number of interrogators. Turner v. Pennsylvania,
338 u.s. 62 (1949).
Condition of place of interrogation. Harris v.
S0uth Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
4. Force, threats, promises, or deception.
Physical abuse. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
Lack of food. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958).
Lack of sleep. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954).
Movement from place to place. Ward v. Texas,
316 u.s. 547 (1942).
Stripped during interrogation. Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
Threats of harm against accused or others.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
Threat of mob violence. Thomas v. Arizona, 356
u.s. 390 (1958).
Advice, promises, or assurances. Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
Deceptions. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959).
For additional factors and cases, see 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence 352 n.11 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); American Law Institute, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
4

statements obtained by private citizens. In contrast, a
coerced and involuntary confession made to a private
citizen may be inadmissible due to its unreliability. For
example, in People v. Switzer, 135 Mich. App. 779,355
N.W.2d 670 (1984), a relative of an eight-month-old child
confronted and accused the defendant of causing the
child's death. After being struck by the relative, the
defendant confessed. On appeal, the court held that it
made no difference that the confession had been obtained by a private citizen: "We therefore conclude that a
confession found to be coerced and involuntarily made is
not admissible in evidence in a criminal trial, even if the
state is not involved in the coercion." !d. at 784-85, 355
N.W.2d at 672. See also State v. Kelly, 61 N.J. 283,
292-93, 294 A.2d 41, 46 (1972); State v. Hess, 9 Ariz. App.
29, 31,449 P.2d 46, 48 (1969).

gat ion alone does not amount to compulsion within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. As one commentator
has noted:

For articles and books on the voluntariness test, see
Berger, Taking the Fifth: The Supreme Court and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 104-12 (1980); Grano,
Vo/untariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65
Va. L. Rev. 859 (1979); Schulhofer, Confessions and the
Court, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 865, 867-78 (1981).

A number of limitations on the scope of the Miranda
rule follow from this analysis. For example, it seems
questionable whether Miranda should apply in "jail plant
cases"- situations where an undercover agent is
placed in a cell with the defendant. If the agent asks
questions about the crime, there may appear to be both
custody and interrogation. Nevertheless, there would not
seem to be "compulsion" as viewed by the Miranda
Court. The psychological pressure to respond to the
questions of a cell mate is simply not the same as the
pressure to respond to a police officer's questions. /d. at
61-62.
The Fifth Amendment analysis also explains why
Miranda warnings are not required when statements are
obtained by private citizens. That Amendment is not
"concerned with moral and psychological pressures to
confess emanating from sources other than official coercion." Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1291 (1985). For
example, in People v. Ray, 65 N.Y.2d 282,480 N.E.2d
1065,491 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1985), the court held that a statement made to a private store detective was not subject to
Miranda: "The avowed purpose of Miranda was to secure
the privilege against self-incrimination from encroachment by governmental action." /d. at-, 480, N.E.2d at
1067, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 285. The court, however, did point
out that private conduct "may become so pervaded by
governmental involvement that it loses its character as
such and invokes the full panoply of constitutional protections." /d. See also State v. Ferrette, 18 Ohio St3d 106,
480 N.E.2d 399 (1985) (security personnel of state lottery
commission are not law enforcement officers and are not
required to give Miranda warnings); 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure§ 6.10(b) (1984).

It is the impact on the suspect's mind of the interplay
between police interrogation and police custody - each
condition reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced
by the other- that, as the Miranda Court correctly discerned, makes "custodial police interrogation" so devastating. It is the susp€)ct's realization that the same persons who
have cut him off from the outside world, and have him in
their power and control, want him to confess, and are delemined to get him to do so, that makes the "interrogation"
more menacing than it would be without the custody and the
"custody" more intimidating than it would be without the
interrogation. Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and
Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67
Geo. L.J. 1, 63 (1978).

FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's holding in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), is now familiar:
[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant
way and is subjected to questioning ... the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires .... After such warnings have
been given, ... the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make
a statement. 384 U.S. at 478-79.
·

For a comphrehensive history of Miranda, see L. Baker,
Miranda: Crime, Law and Politics (1983). See also Kamisar, Book Review, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1074 (1984).

Compulsion & Custodial Interrogation
The doctrinal basis for Miranda is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
"[T)he Court in Miranda, for the first time, expressly
declared that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable to state interrogations at a police station ...." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974). Prior to Miranda it
could have been argued that there was no compulsion
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment in this context because a suspect was not compelled to answer police questions; the police had no legal authority, such as
the contempt power, to compel a statement if the suspect
refused to answer. The Miranda Court rejected this argument, finding that the custodial setting contains "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely." 384 U.S. at
467.
Miranda's Fifth Amendment basis is critical to an understanding of the Court's holding. For one thing, it explains why the Miranda warnings are required only when
there is custodial interrogation. Custody alone or interro-

The Burger Court
Although it seems apparent that a majority of the present Supreme Court would not have adopted Miranda, it
also seems clear that the Court is not about to overrule it.
As Chief Justice Burger has written: "Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices
have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule
Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date."
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U:S. 291, 304 (1980) (concurring opinion).
Nevertheless, the present Court's view of Miranda
differs markedly from the Warren Court's view. In particular, the present Court sees a distinct difference between
Miranda and the Fifth Amendment: "The Miranda exclu-
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imposed on the defendant did not satisy this test, no
wafriihgs'Vilere required and his stationhouse statements''
were admissible.

· sionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps
··m()r:~.QQ~r;dly;tJ;J:a.rr;the"rif:tll~menamenntseiFirmay·5e

trig~;~ered even in the absence. of a Fifth Amendment viol~ttg!,l,~:pr;.eg~y.J:Is.tad.~t05.S,Gt..t285,.1292{1985).
see~~~~o~lCHi9;iifn\tfiick~r;,-41'7 u.s. 433,444 (1974) (The
MJt:.a.rJ!tC';I,~W.arni[lgs.are ~·notthemselves rights protected
byffie:C.on$titulioil ~ ;~. YfThis view of the relationship
betweer:dbe Eifth::Amendr:nentand Miranda has. provided
the basis.for m~r1yC5f the Court's decisions, including the
. impeachment and public safety exceptions to Miranda as
well as the Court's recent analysis of a "fruit of the poisonous tree" issue in Elstad. This view of Miranda, however, has not escaped criticism: "This curious characteriza.tiotfbfMirandtrignores much oftne languageriitflat
case,
most perplexing because it seems to have
'deprived Miranda of a constitutional basis but did not explain what other-basis for itthere might be.' " 1 W.
LaFave &J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 483 (1984). In
other words, if a Miranda violation is not a Fifth Amendmerit violation, on what authority does the U.S. Supreme
Court require exclusion in a state trial; the Court has no
constitutional. authority.to .determine. state evidentiary
rules.

Nonstationhouse interrogations
The Miranda Court's definition of custody also encompasses some interrogations outside the stationhouse. lnterrogatiori,Wtientfie defendant is "in custody at the
station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way," triggers the warning requirement.
One of the first cases applying Miranda involved this issue. In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), four police
officers,entered..thecdefendant's bedroom and questioned him concerning a homicide. One of the officers
testified that the ·defendant was under arrest at the time
of the interrogation. The Court held that Miranda applied.
Nevertheless; the exact point at which custody occurs
remained unclear until the Court addressed the issue in
a series of later cases. In Beckwith y. U.S., 425 U.S. 341
(1976), IRS agents from the Criminal Division questioned
Beckwith at a private horne about his tax liability. Beckwith was not under arrest atthe time of the questioning.
The Court ruled Miranda inapplicable because this situation "simply does not present the elements which the
Miranda Court found so inherently coercive ... ."!d. at
347.
Beckwith is also important because it clearly marked
the abandonment of the "focus" test which had been
used in Escobedo. In explaining custodial interrogation in
Miranda, the Court added the following footnote: "This is
what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused." 384 U.S. at
444 n.4. Despite this attempt to reconcile Escobedo and
Miranda, the two tests -focus and custodial interrogation - are not the same. Beckwith exemplifies this point.
While theCoUrt"conceded thaf"the 'focus' oUm investigation may indeed have been on Beckwith ... , he hardly
found himself in the custodial situation described by the
Miranda Court ...." /d. at 347.
The Court's latest examination of the custody requirement occurred in Berke mer v. McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138
(1984). In that case a misdemeanor traffic offender made
incriminating statements after being stopped for weaving
in and out of a highway Jane. Although the Court stated
that a traffic stop is a seizure of the person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it ruled that such a
seizure does not constitute custody under Miranda. According to the Court, the brief duration of the stop and
the fact that the typical traffic stop occurs in a public
place "reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman
to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does
not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse." !d. at 3150.
The Court, however, recognized that such a stop could
escalate into custody and thereby trigger Miranda:
It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is
curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest."... If a
motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop
thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full
panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. /d. at 3151.

andls

•

I
I

Custody
The threshold issue in applying Miranda is to determinewhen the warnings are required. The Miranda safeguards apply only when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation. The Miranda Court provided the following guidance on this issue: "By custodial interrogation,
we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise depriyed of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 384 U.S. at 444. Notwithstanding this explanation,
bott:J.!'custocJy'!.and·f'interrogation" have required further
elaboration.

Stationhouse interrogations
The Court's opinion in Miranda focused on the inherent coercion of station house interrogations. Nevertheless, subsequent cases have made clear that not all
station house interrogations trigger the Miranda safeguards. For example, in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492(1977), apolice officer requested the defendant to
come to the station house and informed him that he was
not under arrest. During this interview, the defendant
confessed. The Court held that warnings were notrequired:
In the present case ... there is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent's freedom
to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to
the police station, where he was immediately informed that
he was.notuiider arrest. At the close of a V2-hour interview
respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in
custody "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." /d. at 495.
Similarly, in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983)
(per curiam), the defendant voluntarily came to the station house, where he was informed that he was not under
arrest. According to the Court, the inquiry for determining
custody "is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest:' /d. at 1125. Since the restraints

See also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983);
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questioning:
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation"
under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but
also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect/d. at300-01.
Thus, interrogation may sometimes include conduct.
For example, in People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316, 472
N.E.2d 13, 482 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1984), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct. 2700 (1985), the police placed furs stolen from a
murder victim in front of the accused's cell. The court
held that this conduct constituted interrogation.

Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (There
was no custody "since there was no 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest."); United States v. Roark, 753
F.2d 991, 993 (11th Cir. 1985) (bank teller who was questioned at place of employment and who was not under
arrest nor subjected to threats or coercion was not in
custody).
Interrogation
In addition to custody, Miranda requires interrogation
before the warnings are mandated.ln Miranda the Court
defined interrogation as "questioning initiated by Jaw enforcement officers." 384 U.S. at 444. This statement left
several issues unresolved. The Court, however, did provide some guidance by distinguishing interrogation from
volunteered statements.

Warnings
The Miranda decision requires a four-part warning:
"He must be warned prior to any questioning [1] that he
has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. at 479.
The Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the
adequacy of Miranda warnings in only one case. In California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981), after the defendant
had been given the first three parts of the warning, a police officer informed him, because of his juvenile status,
of the right to ha\fe his parents present during questioning. The officer then stated: "[You have] the right to have
a lawyer appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself." The issue before the Court was whether this warning was sufficient. The dissent believed that the warnings
did not convey to the defendant that he had a right to
consult a lawyer without charge before he decided
whether to talk to the police, even if his parents decline to
pay for such legal representation. A majority of the Court
disagreed. The majority wrote: "This Court has never indicated that the 'rigidity' of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant .... Quite the contrary, Miranda itself indicated that
no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures." /d. at 359.
In contrast to the Supreme Court, the lower courts
have considered a number of "warnings" issues. One of
these issues- whether the police are required to inform
a suspect that an attorney has been retained for him has divided the courts. Some courts have imposed such
a requirement. For example, in Weber v. State, 457 A.2d
674 (Del. 1983), a leading case on this issue, the court
stated:
If prior to or during custodial interrogation, and unknown to
the suspect, a specifically retained or properly designated
lawyer is acutally present at a police station seeking an opportunity to render legal advice or assistance to the suspect,
and the police intentionally or negligently fail to inform the
suspect of that fact, then any statement obtained after the
police themselves know of the attorney's efforts to assist the
suspect, or any evidence derived from any such statement,
is not admissible on any theory that the suspect intelligently
and knowingly waived his right to remain silent and his right
to counsel as established by Miranda. /d. at 686.

Volunteered statements
The Miranda Court commented that there "is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police
station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime.
... Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by
the Fifth Amendment ...." 384 U.S. at 478. The principal
problem with this example is that there is also no "custody" in this situation and for that reason alone Miranda
warnings are not required. Nevertheless, even if there is
custody, a sta,tment may be volunteered and thus not
covered by Miranda. For example, in United States v.
Castro, 723 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1984), a customs officer,
after detecting the odor of marijuana, ordered the defendant to come out of a house. When the defendant exited
the house, the officer, who had drawn his gun, asked,
"What in the world is going on here?" The accused replied, "You want money? We got money." Although the
defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant's statements
were unresponsive and thus volunteered: "These. utterances were not responsive to any interrogation. The
statement was not only totally voluntary but also constituted a deliberate attempt to commit a separate crime.
Such a declaration is clearly outside the protection of
Miranda." /d. at 1532.

Interrogation defined
The leading case defining the term "interrogation" is
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In that case
the defendant was placed in a police car, at which time
one officer said to another officer, "[T]here's a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God
forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and
they might hurt themselves." The defendant overheard
this comment and made incriminatory statements. On review, the Court held that there had been no interrogation.
Although one might disagree with the Court's view of the
facts, its definition of interrogation in Innis is a favorable
interpretation of Miranda.
Initially, the Court rejected the view that custody alone
triggers Miranda. According to the Court, interrogation
"must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." /d. at 300. This result
is consistent with Miranda, which required both custody
and interrogation. More importantly, the Court rejected
the view that Miranda applies only if there is express

See also Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691,490 A.2d 1228,
1243 (1985) ("[A] suspect must be fully informed of the
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·· acutal presence and availability of counsel who seeks to
confer with him, in order that any waiver of a right to
counsel, as established by Miranda, can be knowing and
iritelligerif"f; State v. Matthews, 408 So.2d 1274, 1278 (La.
1982).
Other courts have adopted an even more stringent requirement, which is often known as the "New York" rule:
Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not
question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless
there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney,
of the defendant's right to counsel. People v. Arthur, 22
N.Y.2d 325,329,239 N.E.2d 537,539,292 N.Y.S.2d 663,666
(·1968)(emphasis added),

See a/so People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479,481,348
N.E.2d 894, 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976) (state
constitutional rule).
Still other courts have rejected both the New York rule
and the approach set forth in Weber. For example, in
Blanks v. State, 254 Ga. 420, 330 S.E. 2d 575 (1985), the
court held that an otherwise valid waiver is not vitiated by
the police's refusal to permit an. attorney retained by a
third party to speak with the suspect: "The desirability of
legal assistance during interrogation does not turn upon
the rapidity with which third parties have acted to retain
an attorney to enter the proceedings." 330 S.E.2d at 579.

The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari in a case
raising this issue. In Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178 (1st
Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 2699 (1985), a public defender called the police station and asked whether the defendant, a murder suspect, would be interrogated. An
.
unidentified detective said that the defendant would not '
be interrogated. The defendant subsequently made an
incriminatory statement without being informed of the
public defender's call or offer of assistance. The First
Circuit held that under the circumstances of that case the
defendant's waiver was unconstitutional. The court, however, was careful to limit its holding to cases in which the
·~failuretocommunicatebythepolice can only be characterized at the minimum as reckless." /d. at 187.
Another "warning" issue was raised in Peoplev.
Locke, 152 Cal. App.3d 1130,200 CaL Rptr. 20 (1984). In
Locke the court held that where a suspect claims the
right to counsel under Miranda, a "minimal requirement
is that the arrested suspect be told of his or her right, and
be given an opportunity, to use a telephone for the purpose of securing the desired attorney. Such telephone
calls should be allowed immediately upon request, or as
soon thereafter as practicable. Anything less would make
Miranda a hollow ineffectuai pretense." /d. at 1133, 200
Cal. Rptr. at 22.
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